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Public housing in post-colonial Indonesia
The revolution of rising expectations
Public housing may seem a dull topic: a technocratic matter, only interest-
ing to a few specialists in urban studies.1 Yet, public housing can show us 
important things about Indonesia in the 1950s, because seemingly technical, 
neutral planning decisions are in reality highly political choices (Robertson 
1984). First, public housing was an issue in which core assumptions of the 
new state about what would be desirable social policy became manifest. Who 
was entitled to share in the benefits of independent Indonesia? Leaders of 
the young nation felt responsible for housing in general. Unlike the colonial 
state, which purportedly sought to look after the interests of the happy few, 
the independent nation would take care of all the people (or at least, all Indo-
nesians). Although the new leaders probably did not use the word, they were 
aiming at a socialist welfare state. Second, public housing in the 1950s reflects 
the mood of that time. Those responsible for the housing situation were full 
of optimism that they would finally solve the lack of adequate housing. There 
existed a strong notion that they had to do better than the colonial state and 
that they would do better. The ideal was to build a typical middle-class house. 
Third, public housing is one instance where ideals and high expectations of 
the young nation were frustrated by the economic situation. Housing plans 
ran aground in the face of the hard economic and demographic reality that 
there were not enough funds to build a home for all the people. There were 
far too few resources for far too many people and very little was realized. 
Optimism turned into its opposite, pessimism, and even into cynicism. Public 
housing, therefore, is a concrete manifestation of how the decline of constitu-
tional democracy (Feith 1962) worked out in practice.
1 I am grateful for the comments on a paper about public housing received at the conference 
in Yogyakarta in January 2010 as well as those made by two anonymous reviewers. I also thank 
Rosemary Robson for her English corrections, and the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Sport (Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport), which funded the research on which 
this article is based.
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The housing situation of the 1950s was, of course, framed by the preced-
ing decades and cannot be understood without some knowledge of the 1930s 
and 1940s. One of the legacies the young Republic of Indonesia inherited 
from the Dutch East Indies was a serious housing crisis, which had begun to 
emerge during the Japanese period. During the Indonesian Revolution, when 
the Dutch gradually resumed control of almost all cities, they attempted to 
solve the crisis by rent control, allocation of extant housing, reconstruction 
projects of damaged urban quarters, and the development of a mega-project, 
Kebayoran Baru, in the southern part of Jakarta. All these initiatives were 
emergency measures to tackle the housing crisis of the second half of the 
1940s. The principal thrust of the urban housing policy over a longer period 
of ‘normal’ years, though, was public housing: the provision of housing to 
the people by the state either through the construction of houses or indirectly 
through site preparation and provision of infrastructure and offering loans. 
As a starting point of the analysis, I hypothesize that there was a differ-
ence in public housing policy before and after Independence. Public housing 
was to some extent an alien concept in colonial Indonesia. The economy of the 
Dutch East Indies was essentially a liberal one and most construction work 
was undertaken by the private sector. Why should the government bother 
to provide public housing at all? The Explanatory Memorandum to the 1938 
Bill on the Town Planning Ordinance concluded that the public housing cor-
porations catered mainly to the middle classes and the building volume was 
too small to have an impact on the local housing market, except in Semarang 
(Toelichting 1938:34). Assuming for a while that public housing was meant to 
serve the lower classes in general, why did it not make an impact on the local 
housing market? Which groups appropriated the public housing, perhaps to 
the detriment of others who were more entitled to it?
After Independence, the economy continued to be run on capitalist prin-
ciples, but the government took a socialist turn and assumed a broader welfare 
policy (Booth 1998:162). Contemporary thinking was that the benefits of the 
Revolution ought to reach all Indonesians. If this ideal were to be realized in the 
field of housing, public housing should be undertaken on a much more ambi-
tious scale than had hitherto been the case. Decent housing also became a mat-
ter of national pride. For instance, in 1952 Vice-President Mohammad Hatta (as 
quoted by Herlambang 2004:37) remarked that most houses resembled a cow-
shed and were inappropriate to an independent, self-confident nation. Such 
ideas were common in young states. India, for instance, embarked on a major 
construction programme after Independence, with designs influenced by the 
Modern Movement in architecture (Lang 1989:387). Public housing was indeed 
restarted on a massive scale in Indonesia in the early 1950s, but the building 
volume soon fell off. This brief outline of public housing raises the questions 
of what happened to public housing during the decolonization, which groups 
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were reached, what the size of the public housing sector was, and why public 
housing soon failed to live up to the high expectations of the political leaders, 
and perhaps the general public too, after Independence.
Public housing in colonial times
Public housing served a particular segment of the housing market in colo-
nial Indonesia. The public sector was relatively small in number and did 
not weigh heavily on the total housing market. One clear differentiation be-
tween various actors who constructed and sold and/or rented out houses lay 
in the demand for the specific houses that the actors met. Each actor occu-
pied a niche in the housing market. Real estate developers found houses with 
monthly rents below 30 guilders not profitable and were most interested in 
houses that yielded rents of 80 guilders or more, one per cent of the market. 
These developers were not interested in houses with a rental value below 30 
guilders, because the problems incurred in rent collection, each with a narrow 
profit margin, were not worth the effort, and if the houses were sold the prof-
its were relatively small. As a rule public housing targeted the middle-income 
groups, who could afford rents between 10 and 80 guilders (about one-fifth 
of the whole market). Real estate developers also ventured into this middle 
segment of the market, but the lower the price, the more difficult it became 
for developers in the formal sector of the economy to compete with dwellings 
built and sold and/or rented in the informal sector. Only urban administra-
tors, who were prepared to subsidize houses permanently, were able to build 
houses with rents below 30 guilders. At the bottom end of the housing market, 
many dwellings with a rental value below 10 guilders were built by the occu-
pants themselves. However, certainly not all houses with rental values below 
10 guilders were self-constructed houses. Many of them were built by small 
landlords who rented out one or at most a few houses (Colombijn 2010:356-8).
A first start with public housing was made in 1913 by the municipality 
of Batavia, which built 54 houses in the model kampong Tamansari. Several 
other municipalities followed suit and established gemeentelijke woningbedrij-
ven (housing authorities) under various formal names, with the aim of reduc-
ing the shortage of housing. By 1929 over 3,000 houses had been built or were 
under construction under this scheme (Dick 2002:199; Rückert 1930:167-70).
Despite all this work, it gradually dawned on the municipal administra-
tions that not enough houses were provided for the lowest income groups. 
The Medan housing administration was one of the organizations that sin-
cerely tried to build for the poor, but it discovered that even the cheapest 
houses in Kampong Sekip (rents at 5.50 guilders) were already too expensive 
for the lowest income groups. The design, with a shared kitchen, made the 
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houses unattractive for those people in the income bracket just above the 
lowest income group, who would be able to pay a rent of 5.50 guilders. The 
unspoken conclusion in Medan and elsewhere was that the municipality 
should accept the obligation to provide cheap housing below cost price if it 
wanted to serve the lower classes. Government funds, however, were insuf-
ficient to build for all the poor (Colombijn 2010:325-6). More needed to be 
done through another channel.
In 1922 and 1925 representatives of municipal administrations throughout 
the archipelago (but mostly from Java) organized two congresses to discuss 
public housing. The upshot of these conferences was that the state accepted 
its responsibility to take a leading role in public housing for low-income 
groups. As of 1925 the central government supported municipal administra-
tions that established a N.V. Volkshuisvesting (Public Housing Corporation 
Ltd). The Public Housing Corporations paved the way for local govern-
ments to acquire both land and attract capital for housing (Karsten 1930; Van 
Roosmalen 2004:191-3, 2008:68-9, 72). Public Housing Corporations with a 
limited liability bore the standard name N.V. Volkshuisvesting followed by 
the place name. The central government donated 75 per cent of the capital 
and the municipality 25 per cent. By 1930 16 cities (of which 13 in Java) had 
established an N.V. Volkshuisvesting, but not all corporations got the houses 
beyond the stage of the drawing board (Indisch Verslag 1931, II:182).
The central and local governments never intended to bear the brunt of 
the costs of housing and as a rule did not pay up the capital stock in full. 
Consequently, the capital stock was insufficient for the purpose for which 
the corporations were established and additional funds had to be found. 
The form of a company with limited liability was chosen to enable each N.V. 
Volkshuisvesting to borrow money on the capital market. It could negotiate 
low interest rates, because the central government guaranteed repayment of 
the loan. Using state funds to guarantee the repayment of loans on the capital 
market seemed a more efficient use of scarce state funds than to pay the full 
costs of construction work, as had been done by the gemeentelijke woning-
bedrijven. Over 2,500 houses were built by the joint N.V. Volkshuisvesting 
corporations up to 1932 (Flieringa 1930:139, 142; Gerritsen 1924; Indisch 
Verslag 1933, I:333-5). Unfortunately, the Depression of the 1930s halted fur-
ther construction work. The overall impact of public housing was very small 
in view of the number of houses of the gemeentelijke woningbedrijven and N.V. 
Volkshuisvesting corporations compared to the total housing stock. Its share 
was only six per cent in the most favourable case, Semarang, and less than 
one per cent in Batavia (Colombijn 2010:330).
If building volumes in colonial Indonesia were unsatisfactory, the extent 
to which lowest income groups were reached was even more disappointing. 
Kampong Sekip in Medan revealed the discrepancy between the ideal and 
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reality of building for the poor. Nonetheless, the municipal housing authori-
ties established in the 1910s had at least the advantage that they could cross-
subsidize houses with low and high rents. Moreover, a possible deficit could be 
made up from the total municipal budget. Neither of these options was open 
to an N.V. Volkshuisvesting, which was managed as an independent company, 
accountable to its shareholders. The requirement that projects be profitable 
severely restricted the potential target group of an N.V. Volkshuisvesting. After 
all, it was almost impossible to build houses for the lowest income groups, 
which could compete on the rental market with houses in the informal sec-
tor. Public housing was only cost-effective in the income bracket above the 
lowest income groups. As a rule therefore, the N.V. Volkshuisvesting corpora-
tions offered fewer houses at the lowest rents than the municipal gemeentelijke 
woningbedrijven had done. The requirement that the N.V. Volkshuisvesting 
corporations had to run at a profit came under attack from some urban admin-
istrators, who felt that this requirement conflicted with the stated aim of the 
corporations (Cobban 1993:894). Their misgivings, however, did not result in a 
policy change, with the partial exceptions of Semarang and Surabaya. 
The designs provide further evidence that colonial public housing was not 
seriously tailored to suit kampong people, or indigenous people for that mat-
ter. In a paper presented at the 1922 congress on public housing, renowned 
Dutch architect and urban planner, Thomas Karsten (1922:36), lamented the 
‘unindigenous’ (oninlandsche) designs of what were nevertheless described 
as indigenous types of public housing. He criticized European architects for 
‘standard designs [that] were thought out on the drawing board, without 
looking around in the kampong’ (Karsten 1922:54). The designs employed 
a front gallery, wide corridors and rooms of equal size, but what was really 
needed for indigenous people was one large room. If an indigenous family 
could afford more space, a small room or merely a lean-to to receive visitors 
was the first priority, plus a small bedroom for the children. Karsten wrote 
this before the N.V. Volkshuisvesting corporations had been launched, but 13 
years later H.E. Boissevain (1935:6) reached a similar conclusion in retrospect: 
the N.V. Volkshuisvesting corporations did not have any real insight into the 
housing needs of their target group. In sum, colonial public housing was too 
expensive for the lower incomes, too small to make much impact and of a 
design that was impractical for the lower incomes.
During the Depression of the 1930s, the corporations ran into trouble 
because their income declined (rents decreased and houses stood empty), 
while the costs of interest payments invariably remained high. The difficul-
ties of the corporations were only overcome because the central government 
remitted debts in 1936, but no new construction work was undertaken. In 
1939 the Commissie voor de Kampongverbetering (1939:50) summed up the 
situation of the various N.V. Volkshuisvesting corporations.The exploitation 
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of rental houses had proven risky during the Depression, and state funds 
were locked up in assets. It would be better to sell off the houses and use the 
money raised for new construction work. This plan made sense, but before 
decision makers could take it into consideration, the Second World War put 
a spoke in the wheels.
The N.V. Volkshuisvesting corporations would all survive the Japanese 
period, but came out of the occupation decrepit. After Independence the 
corporations were steadily liquidated, one by one. However, as late as 1960 
the N.V. Volkshuisvesting Surabaya was, judging from its annual report, still 
standing although its income was barely half the expenditures.2 The N.V. 
Volkshuisvesting Makassar was liquidated that same year or in 1961. At that 
time the administration was in a jumble; the Director knew neither the num-
ber of houses the corporation still owned nor the identity of all occupants.3 
Probably the other N.V. Volkshuisvesting corporations were phased out in a 
similar way.
The Japanese period
The Japanese did not invest much time and effort in public housing. A widely 
publicized shifting of a kampong in Cirebon had the character of public hous-
ing. Another kampong was built near the bus station in Bandung to absorb 
new migrants to the city (Asia Raya, 22-6-2603, 9-9-2603; Djawa Baroe, 9-1-2603).
More was said than done during the Japanese times. In November 1942 
the 16th Army (entrusted with military administration of Java) set up a think 
tank with the somewhat misleading name Kyûkan Seido Tyôsa Linkai or 
Panitia Adat dan Tatanegara Dahoeloe (Committee for Tradition and the 
Organization of Government). It brought together the crème de la crème of 
Indonesian nationalism (Soekarno, Hatta, Ki Hadjar Dewantara (Suwardi 
Surjaningrat), Oto Iskandar Dinata, and others) as well as top Japanese 
officers. The Committee talked about such issues as unemployment, educa-
tion, public health, food, and clothing. Housing as a topic was accorded less 
priorit y and it was addressed in the Committee’s last meeting in October 
1943.4 The whole brainstorming session took place against the background of 
2 Arsip Surabaya, Box 299, no. 4932. N.V. Volkshuisvesting [Surabaya], Laporan tahunan 1960.
3 Arsip Makassar, 1950-1960 vol. 79. Rapat Dewan Komisaris N.V. Volkshuisvesting Makassar, 
22-10-1960; letter Tan Siong Lien, Direktur N.V. Volkshuisvesting Makassar, to Walikota, Kepala 
Daerah Djakarta Raya, Makassar, 7-3-1961, no. 11/NV/61.
4 National Archives, The Hague, Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service (NEFIS) en Centrale 
Militaire Inlichtingendienst (CMI) in Nederlands-Indië, nummer toegang 2.10.62, inventarisnum-
mer 2241, Meeting Kyûkan Seido Tyôsa Linkai/Panitia Adat dan Tatanegara Dahoeloe, 5-10-2603 
[1943]. I am grateful to Shigeru Sato for pointing out the existence of this document to me and to 
Margaret Leidelmeijer for locating it in the National Archives. See also Kan Pō 1(7) 2602.
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the economic hardship engendered by the war situation. In the most explicit 
reference to the war, Chairman Saito remarked that it was practical to build 
using cheap, non-durable material at a time in which houses ran the risk of 
being destroyed in air raids.
Kijai Hadji Mas Mansoer opened the debate by drawing attention to the 
dire housing situation of the indigenous people. The solution to the problem 
of how to build many houses cheaply was standardization of design and 
mass production of building elements at central places. Mansoer sketched the 
outlines of a ‘house that is cheap and healthy’ (roemah jang moerah dan sehat). 
The ground plan (10x14 m) was based on a colonial middle-class dwelling 
(with different rooms for different functions, and a veranda), for a family 
of five persons. The houses had to be built from cheap, and easily avail-
able materials, in other words (under the war conditions) from non-durable 
material. In contrast to the colonial villas, walls had to be made from plaited 
bamboo or the pulp of recycled paper. The use of cement and nails should be 
avoided. Soekarno, the second speaker, elaborated on Mansoer’s ideas.
Hatta offered two other ideas. The first was to found associations, which 
would sell dwellings to ordinary people through a hire-purchase system; 
such associations could be modelled on similar associations in colonial times, 
which however had only served the middle class. The second proposition 
was to establish an association of engineers and other technical experts with 
formal education, emulating the recently founded association of medical 
doctors. Hatta, not very familiar with Japanese, suggested: ‘Association of 
bla-bla… in Java (I do not know the word)’ (perkoempoelan Djawa... Kai (saja 
tidak tahoe namanja)).
Oto Iskandar Dinata analysed the poor sanitary condition of urban kam-
pongs, which was attributed to discriminatory colonial policy. Kampong 
improvement was one solution and if need be kampongs had to be demol-
ished first to allow for a more spacious rebuilding.
The Japanese members of the Committee had the final word in the meet-
ing and although their ideas would remain totally inconsequential in terms 
of implemented policy, it is interesting to note how they looked at the issue. 
They led the discussion in a different direction. Matuura recounted that 
Indonesian students who visited Japan were surprised that there were no 
kampongs. The reason was, he explained, that there was no colonial power, 
which pushed the indigenous people into the urban fringe. The Dutch villas 
in Indonesia stood empty, but if Indonesians were to occupy them, Matuura 
asserted, they would worry about how to pay the electricity, gas, and water 
bills. So, the first requirement for improving the living conditions was to instil 
a sense of thrift in the Indonesian population. As it was, when Indonesians 
earned a higher hourly pay, they tended to become lazier instead of saving 
the extra income.
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Kitazima took Matuura’s criticism one step further and lashed out at the 
Indonesians, who he claimed, were deficient in skills, knowledge (especially 
in mathematics), and thrift. The aspiration of Indonesians was to become civil 
servants, not traders. Therefore no indigenous middle class had developed, 
whereas the strength of the middle class determines the strength of a nation. 
We could blame the Dutch or the war situation for the poverty, Kitazima 
argued, but ‘the biggest blame was attributed to the Indonesians themselves’ 
(kesalahan jang terbesar itoe didjatoehkan kepada pihak Indonésia sendiri).
One wonders how the Indonesian committee members felt about these 
insulting words. To a certain extent, however, Indonesian nationalists shared 
with Matuura and Kitazima – as with the preceding Dutch overlords – a pater-
nalistic attitude towards the lower class. They believed they knew what was 
best for the masses. Mansoer, Soekarno, and Hatta all remarked that craftsmen 
needed to attend training courses because they lacked expertise, especially in 
the design of ‘healthy’ housing (to control pests, malaria, and tuberculosis) 
and vernacular architecture. Oto Iskandar Dinata recommended a publicity 
campaign via newspapers, radio, and face-to-face meetings to acquaint people 
living in kampong with building plans for acceptable dwellings. There was, 
however, also a major contrast with the former colonial overlords. The focus 
of the entire debate was on low-income groups, or ‘rakjat djelata’ (proletariat). 
The debate did not lead to any concrete policy goal, let alone action.
The idea of public housing in independent times
The discussion was resumed at the seminal Congress on Healthy Public 
Housing (Kongres Perumahan Rakjat Sehat), held in Bandung on 25-31 Au-
gust 1950, which marked the start of public housing in independent Indone-
sia, both in a symbolic and practical sense. Administrators from all provinces, 
cities, and towns and technical experts congregated to discuss the housing 
needs of the young republic. Six papers were presented, five by Indonesian 
experts and only one by a Dutchman. The participants also made field trips in 
Bandung and they could study an exhibition of photographs.5
The spirit at the congress was that the housing situation of the less well-
to-do masses could finally be improved now that colonial interests no longer 
predominated. In a paper by Soeandi and Soekander, the minimal require-
ments of a house were sketched, taking constructional, economic, social, 
hygienic, and pedagogic factors into account. This imagined minimal house 
was made up of a main building of 36 m2 and an annex of 17.5 m2. The main 
building consisted of a living room, a dining room, and two bedrooms, and 
5 Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia (ANRI), Jakarta, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia 
1950-1959 vol. 1268. Tjatatan Laporan Konggres Perumahan Rakjat Sehat, Bandung, 25-8-1950.
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the annex contained a kitchen, bathroom, and toilet. This house, Soeandi 
and Soekander underscored, was a dwelling quite distinct from the house 
with a floor space of 15 m2, once designed by Thomas Karsten for Kampong 
Mlaten in Semarang. The Dutch had only looked at public housing from an 
economic perspective. A person who from childhood has to live in a house 
that is too small and unhealthy, the two authors stated, ‘will have a sense 
of inferiority (minderwaardigheidscomplex [Dutch in the original text]). It was 
apparently this characteristic the colonizer wished to inculcate in the spirit of 
the colonized people.’6 Fortunately, the Indonesians were independent now 
and had to shake off this feeling of inferiority as quickly as possible.7 Size 
was not the only aspect that mattered, houses also had to promote health. A 
healthy house (rumah sehat) should be equipped with sufficient openings for 
air circulation and allow some sunlight to enter. The second condition of a 
healthy house was a floor made of tiles or concrete, which could be swabbed 
down every day (Antara, 13-11-1952/A).
The ideas voiced at the congress clearly echoed the broad outline of a 
public housing policy sketched by the Indonesian nationalist leaders in the 
Japanese-Indonesian joint Committee for Tradition and the Organization of 
Government. The intention behind the goal to build for the poor was serious 
and it had already been articulated in the Committee’s meeting of 5 October 
1943. The floor plan of a healthy house designed by Soeandi and Soekander 
had been sketched by Kijai Hadji Mas Mansoer, albeit in less detail.
The Congress on Healthy Public Housing of August 1950 drew three con-
clusions. First, technical standards following the ideal sketched by Soeandi 
and Soekander were set with the aim of constructing houses that were healthy 
in both a physical and social sense. Second, the local government had to take 
the lead in the construction of large numbers of houses that met this minimal 
standard. There was a sense of urgency in this respect, because, while the 
state sat by idly, squatters were building new insalubrious houses. Pictures 
of unhygienic living conditions in kampongs testified to the squalor. Besides, 
people would be dissatisfied with the government if new houses were not 
built rapidly. (The latter point was reminiscent of the political argument for 
kampong improvement in colonial times.) Third, seemingly in contradic-
tion to the second point, the local housing strategy should be executed by a 
system of a co-operative housing association (bouwkassysteem), which would 
act more decisively than the official bureaucracy with its hands tied by red 
tape. The central government should provide financial support to kick-start 
6 ‘[…] akan mempunjai rasa kurang harga diri (minderwaardigheids-complex). Sifat inilah jang 
rupanja oleh sipendjadjah dikenhendaki pada djiwa rakjat jang didjadjahnja.’
7 Kota Besar Semarang 1952:125. Another indication the Indonesians wanted to shed the Dutch 
connection was an exhibition of American housing, displayed in the prestigious Hotel des Indes 
preceding the congress (Antara, 26-6-1950/B). 
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the co-operative housing associations and deposits by potential clients would 
subsequently enlarge local funds. One week after the congress a delegation 
of participants presented the conclusions to President Soekarno, and a few 
months later a follow-up letter recapitulated the main recommendations.8
The enthusiasm of the time and the rapid acceptance of the new discourse 
on healthy houses was reflected in the plan of Medan to sell 106 hectares of 
land to citizens who wanted to build healthy houses as well as in the optimis-
tic statement by the Mayor of Surabaya that he would make his city a model 
city with good housing by building 10,000 healthy houses for the people. The 
Ministry of Public Works and the Indonesian Parliament pledged support in 
October 1950.9 
In many ways, the Congress on Healthy Public Housing was right, of 
course, but economic constraints dampened the enthusiasm and brought 
lofty ideals back to reality with a bump. For instance, the administration of 
Semarang built 55 houses according to the prescriptions laid down by the 
congress with the assistance of a central state subsidy, but had to admit that 
the rents were affordable for ‘only middle-class people’ (lapisan menengah 
sadjalah). Therefore, the municipality built another 54 cheaper houses for 
the lowest income groups from its own budget, but lamented that lack of 
funds prohibited the construction of more houses needed for hundreds of 
other low-income people (Kota Besar Semarang 1952:125). At the same time, 
Palembang sold off its first ‘people’s housing’, because at a price of Rp. 57,000 
they were too expensive for public housing (Antara, 8-9-1952/A). Likewise, 
the first houses built in Surabaya with central state support were criticized as 
being ‘mini villas’, beyond the means of the poor (Dick 2002:214).
Among other things the post-colonial villa-type design made an ironic 
comment about the colonial society. The ideal house according to the guide-
lines of the Congress on Healthy Public Housing, the drawing of a house that 
adorned the proceedings of the congress, and the first houses actually built 
according to the guidelines would have been considered a ‘European type’ 
of house in colonial times. This fact suggests that the designation ‘European’ 
and ‘indigenous’ type of house refers to costs and quality and not to a specific 
ethnic design (Colombijn 2010:123-33, 337).
8 Antara, 2-3-1950/A, 2-8-1950/A, 24-8-1950/B, 5-9-1950/B; Kota Besar Semarang 1952:125; Her-
lambang 2004:31. ANRI, Jakarta, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia 1950-1959 vol. 1268. Let-
ter R.M. Soetarjo and R. Soendjoto, Ketua and Panitera Konggres Perumahan Rakjat Sehat, to 
President Republik Indonesia, 12-2-1951; Tjatatan Laporan Konggres Perumahan Rakjat Sehat, 
Bandung, 25-8-1950, both attached to the aforementioned letter. A second Congress on Healthy 
People’s Housing, held in 1952, was far less consequential (Antara, 21-8-1952/B; Berita Indonesia, 
13-10-1951).
9 Antara, 6-9-1950/A, 24-11-1950/B. ANRI, Jakarta: Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia 1950-
1959 vol. 1268. Letter R.M. Soetarjo and R. Soendjoto, atas nama Kongres Perumahan Rakjat Sehat 
kepada Presiden Republik Indonesia, 12-2-1951.
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Financing post-colonial public housing
The question of how to finance the fine, but frightfully expensive, villa-like 
healthy houses preoccupied the Indonesian government from the outset. The 
concept of the Co-operative Housing Association, or Jajasan Kas Pembangun-
an, formed the answer sought by government policymakers to the shortage 
of funds. The concept was first launched at the Congress on Healthy Public 
Housing of August 1950, probably by the financial genius Soemitro Djojoha-
dikoesoemo, about to be appointed as Minister of Trade and Industry, who 
had written a paper dealing with the question of how to finance housing.10
The concept was made official state policy by a decree promulgated in 
1952. People who wished to put aside money for a house could deposit their 
savings in such an association. The central government provided the start-
ing capital for a Jajasan Kas Pembangunan to build the first houses and the 
savings of the members ensured that the capital of their Jajasan was replen-
ished. Ideally, the financing and construction cycle would be repeated end-
lessly (Dick 2002:215; Herlambang 2004:31). The Jajasan Kas Pembangunan 
replaced the N.V. Volkshuisvesting, but was financed in a different way. 
Capital came from the central government and members of the local Jajasan 
Kas Pembangunan. The houses were to be sold and the money from the sales 
was to be reinvested. In theory the profit from the sales and the deposits of 
the members guaranteed that far more houses could be built than had been 
done by the colonial N.V. Volkshuisvesting. The N.V. Volkshuisvesting, after 
all, had rented out its houses and used the rents mostly for the upkeep of the 
houses and not to invest in new construction work.
An important step was the establishment of the national Djawatan 
Peroemahan Rakjat (soon spelled Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat, People’s 
Housing Department) in 1951. The Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat allocated 
state funds, where possible through the local Jajasan Kas Pembangunan. 
From the outset the Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat was also encumbered with 
the tasks of collecting data about the housing demand, setting building pre-
scriptions, solving technical problems, drawing standard designs, launching 
new ideas about general housing policy, and finding answers to the question 
of how to finance construction.11 In short, it also served as a think tank.
The Jajasan Kas Pembangunan fared differently in various cities. Jakarta 
had a Jajasan Kas Pembangunan as early as 1952 (Antara, 17-3-1952/B; Berita 
Indonesia, 12-3-1952). By 1954, no fewer than 10 Jajasan Kas Pembangunan had 
been founded in East Java, but only the Co-operative Housing Association 
10 ANRI, Jakarta, Kabinet Presiden Republik Indonesia 1950-1959 vol. 1268. Tjatatan Laporan 
Konggres Perumahan Rakjat Sehat, Bandung, 25-8-1950.
11 Private collection R.J. Clason, Notulen vergadering Raad van Beheer Centrale Stichting 
Weder opbouw, 30-6-1950; Antara, 21-8-1952/B; Berita Indonesia, 23-1-1952; Herlambang 2004:31.
 Freek Colombijn448
of Jember had actually built any houses at that time. The Jajasan Kas 
Pembangunan Surabaya was the last one to be founded in East Java, but one 
year after its creation it already counted 500 members and had built 30 houses 
of Rp. 30,000. The next year, 1956, the number of houses built doubled. 
However, a first crack in the mirror appeared when in the same year the 
Jajasan Kas Pembangunan Surabaya decided to raise the price of the remain-
ing building sum by 20 per cent ‘to cover administrative costs’, which predict-
ably roused a storm of protest from its members who were still waiting for a 
house (Antara, 4-8-1954/A, 26-9-1954/A-B, 25-12-1955/A-B, 27-7-1956/A).
The Jajasan Kas Pembangunan Palembang formed a special case in the 
sense that it was almost wholly financed by the Standard Vacuum Oil 
Company (Stanvac). The company donated Rp. 500,000, and stood surety for 
a loan from a bank. Moreover, the oil company lent Rp. 1,200,000 interest-free, 
but this amount was earmarked for the construction of houses for its own 
personnel. Later the company donated another Rp 400,000. Not surprisingly, 
the Jajasan Kas Pembangunan in Palembang was accused of building only for 
Stanvac. Presumably for this reason, in 1956 the Jajasan Kas Pembangunan 
Palembang was established anew, this time without the close tie to Stanvac 
(Antara, 19-12-1952/A, 19-12-1953/A, 19-4-1956/A; Berita Indonesia, 22-3-1954).
In sum, the Jajasan Kas Pembangunan evoked different responses. The 
administration of Makassar and several places in East Java seemed to estab-
lish one only in response to pressure from the central Djawatan Perumahan 
Rakjat; in some places the founding of housing associations was no more 
than a symbolic gesture. According to Johan Silas (2005:12), 200 Jajasan Kas 
Pembangunan were established in the space of two years and it is unthink-
able that they all actually built houses. In other places, however, specific par-
ties recognized the potential of the Jajasan Kas Pembangunan to help solve 
their own housing problems and were eager to control the associations, for 
instance, Stanvac in Palembang and some local administrations. 
The result of public housing in the 1950s
In order to assess the success of the public housing policy of the 1950s it is 
necessary to give an idea of the shortage of housing at the time. The shortage 
was enormous, due to the ravages of war, lack of private building initiatives 
and most of all large-scale migration to the cities. To give an idea, in 1951, 
the city of Bandung was short of an estimated 40,000 houses to accommodate 
people whose houses had been incinerated by the rebels of the Darul Islam 
movement. Jakarta was the city with the largest estimated shortage of houses, 
70,000 dwellings in 1949. Mayor Sudiro of Jakarta remarked at a press confer-
ence in 1955 that the shortage of housing formed the most serious problem he 
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faced (Antara, 24-3-1950/B, 21-10-1951/A-B, 9-1-1955/A-B). Dutch diplomats in 
Makassar reported that the need for housing in that city was as pressing as 
everywhere else in Indonesia.12
How many houses were actually built by the state after the transfer of sov-
ereignty? The houses financed by the Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat provided 
very little relief for the overstrained urban housing market, even if we assume 
that all the houses financed by the Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat were built 
in the towns and cities (Table 1). After a flying start in 1951, the year of the 
Department’s inception, the number almost doubled and peaked the next year, 
1952, but thereafter sank to a mere 900 houses in 1954. This number was very 
small compared to the houses built by the private sector. For instance, in 1954 
the Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat financed 900 houses, while the private sector 
applied for 5,400 building permits in Surabaya alone (Antara, 15-2-1955/A).
Table 1. Number of houses financed by Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat, 1951-1954
1951 1952 1953 1954
Houses built 1,217 2,234 1,259 909
Investment in billions of rupiahs 20.3 25.5 20.4 15.0
Investment in 1951 prices 20.3 24.0 18.4 12.8
Source: Antara, 27-1-1955/B; Indonesia Raya, 23-2-1954. Deflator to calculate investment in 1951 
prices from Van der Eng 2002.
The obvious explanation for the declining building volume despite all good 
intentions is the quick reduction in the central government’s contribution to 
the Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat. Even in the top year, 1952, actual expendi-
ture fell short of the Rp. 30 million budgeted and in 1953 actual spending was 
Rp. 7 million less than the budget (Antara, 16-10-1951/B, 16-7-1953/A). The 
reduction in state expenditures on housing was even larger when inflation is 
taken into account. The Djawatan Perumahan Rakjat complained that 0.1 per 
cent of the Indonesian state budget was spent on housing, compared to, for 
instance, 2 per cent of the Dutch national budget (Indonesia Raya, 23-2-1954). 
To put the scale of these investments in housing into perspective, the simulta-
neous construction of Jalan Thamrin, the 4-km stretch of road connecting the 
city centre with Kebayoran, cost Rp. 15 million to build; the total 1953 budget 
of the Ministry for Public Works was Rp. 688 million (Antara, 22-12-1953/B, 
16-2-1955/B). At the end of the day, we can conclude, housing was not a top 
priority of the central government.
12 National Archives, The Hague, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Nederlands Commissari-
aat Makassar, (1947) 1950-1957, nummer toegang 2.05.61.04, inventarisnummer 46, Letter Com-
missariaat Makassar, 15-2-1957, no. 692/240.
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The devastating effect of relentless inflation is not only apparent in Table 
1, but also haunted individual building projects. The Ministry for Labour 
increased the initial budget for the construction of 110 houses in Tanjung 
Priok from Rp. 3.3 million to Rp. 5.4 million to fill holes in the budget pro-
duced by rising prices. In case the budget for a project was fixed, the number 
of houses built was lowered to balance the budget. For instance, when Rp. 
1.8 million proved insufficient to build 100 houses in the port of Surabaya, 
the plan was first scaled down to 58 houses, and eventually probably no 
more than 48 were actually built. By the time the full building programme 
in the port of Surabaya was terminated, in 1953, a mere 113 of the envisaged 
450 workers’ houses had been built (Antara, 17-12-1951/B, 1-4-1952/A, 27-7-
1952/A-B, 5-5-1953/A).
Inflation was especially ruinous for the local Jajasan Perumahan Rakjat, 
because to their horror members of the associations noticed that their sav-
ings evaporated without returning any concrete result; shocked they no 
longer deposited savings in the co-operative (Keijser 1994:80; Silas 2005:12). 
Eventually, rapid inflation eroded the funds available and brought public 
housing to a standstill.
The more the hard conclusion became inescapable that it was impossible 
for the state to build houses for everybody, the more the state retracted into 
a policy of serving only its own civil servants. The state’s move to reserve 
public housing predominantly for its own civil servants had already begun 
shortly before the transfer of sovereignty. Already in 1949, the government 
decided to distribute 1,400 houses in Kebayoran, originally meant for low-
income residents in general, to its civil servants.13
The changed focus in public housing was accompanied by an almost 
imperceptible shift in the way the state presented the housing crisis: from 
estimates of the general shortage of housing to estimates of the number of 
new dwellings needed for civil servants. For instance, in 1950 the Jakarta 
administration calculated that 4,800 out of 6,000 planned new houses were 
required for civil servants (but at least it still mentioned the total number of 
new houses required). Two years later, the administration in Surabaya merely 
counted the number of houses necessary for civil servants: 2,500. By 1953 and 
1954, the housing problem was also being debated exclusively in terms of the 
shortage of houses for civil servants in Medan, Palembang, Makassar and 
Manado (Antara, 26-9-1950/A, 11-12-1952/A, 13-3-1953/B, 13-2-1954/A). By 
the time people were moved to make room for the Asian Games in Jakarta, in 
1962, it seemed quite natural that the state built houses only for relocated civil 
13 ANRI, Jakarta, Algemene Secretarie 1061. Letter A.Th. Bogaardt, Secretaris van Staat Sociale 
Zaken, to Hoge Vertegenwoordiger van de Kroon, 9-12-1949, no. H 2-21-13; Private collection R.J. 
Clason, Notulen vergadering Raad van Beheer Centrale Stichting Wederopbouw, 28-7-1950.
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servants (at kampong Slipi) and not for other displaced residents.14
Some officials served their own interests quite blatantly. The first four 
houses built by the Public Works Department of Makassar were meant for 
the four urban planners.15 The construction of 10 military officers’ houses 
in Semarang was financed by the sale of 6,000 ‘mutual assistance letters’ 
(surat gotong rojong) to soldiers of the garrison (Antara, 19-10-1955/A). The 
privates were given this unique opportunity to show their solidarity with 
their commanders starting from 5 October 1955, the tenth anniversary of the 
Indonesian armed forces.
Nevertheless, it is too easy to depict the prioritizing of civil servants 
merely as selfishness. Many civil servants had to lodge in hotels for want of 
a private dwelling and the costs to the state were substantial. According to 
one estimate, the state spent Rp. 12 million annually on hotel costs in Jakarta 
alone, or Rp. 35 million in all of Indonesia (Antara, 13-2-1954/A , 28-4-1954/B). 
The bill was more than double the total budget of the Djawatan Perumahan 
Rakjat for that year. At least as late as 1959 civil servants occupied 302 rooms 
in two hotels in Jakarta (Perkampungan Asian Games 1959). The problem 
of how to house all civil servants had been exacerbated by the merger of 
the Dutch colonial and republican bureaucracies in 1949 and the failure to 
execute the repeatedly professed goal to reduce the number of civil servants 
(Feith 1962:83, 305). Outside the national capital civil servants were also put 
up in hotels. In Medan, 600 civil servants lived in 200 hotel rooms and 400 
rooms in guest houses, which cost Rp. 15-20 per official per day. This came 
down to almost Rp. 4 million per year in 1953. Three years later the same 
number of civil servants still lived in hotels and guest houses; the annual 
hotel costs equalled the construction cost of over 200 modest houses (Antara, 
13-3-1953/B, 15-3-1956/A, 29-8-1956/A). In sum, the expenditures on hotels 
of the past three years would have been enough to build houses for all the 
civil servants who lived in hotels in Medan during those three years. In other 
words, the investment in the construction of houses for civil servants would 
easily have been recovered.
The argument that building houses for civil servants was necessary to 
reduce hotel costs could not be applied to another state policy that favoured 
civil servants. This other policy accorded civil servants preferential treatment 
when the state began to sell off its housing stock in 1955; it concerned 4,800 
houses in Java and Madura.16 In Jakarta, the occupants-civil servants had the 
14 ANRI, Jakarta, Soetikno Lukito Disastro 1959-1960, 16. Keputusan Letkol. Soetikno Ketua 
Penguasa Perang Daerah SW I Djakarta Raya, Panitia Ad Hoc Pembangunan, 8-9-1961, no. 01/
PAP/VIII/1961.
15 Arsip Makassar, 1950-1960, 340, Letter J.Th. Droop, Direktur Pekerjaan Umum, to Acting 
Walikota Makassar, 19-11-1951, no. 1396-79-00.
16 The timing is conspicuous; were political parties in government trying to buy the votes of 
civil servants in the 1955 elections?
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first pick of the government houses for sale. Other civil servants who did not 
occupy any of the state houses had second choice, taking precedence over 
occupants who were not civil servants. Presumably, the latter were required to 
leave when a civil servant desired the house. Civil servants could acquire the 
houses by a rental-purchase system, and the professed aim was to raise funds 
for new construction activities and to cut down on the maintenance costs of 
rental dwellings. A national regulation pertaining to this was issued in 1955; 
only civil servants who had been employed for at least 10 years were eligible. 
What is more, when civil servants paid in instalments over 20 years, inflation 
made their monthly repayment trifling compared to the value of the house.17 
Incidentally, selling municipal houses to non-civil servants by the authorities 
was illegal, but did occur. The Head of the Housing Authority in Bandung 
(Bagian Perusahaan Perumahan Kotabesar Bandung) and an accomplice were 
arrested for accepting bribes of between Rp. 1,000 and Rp. 3,000 for the sale of 
14 municipal houses to non civil-servants (Antara, 28-12-1956/A).
Whatever the professed aim of the sale of state houses may have been, the 
reality was that civil servants were offered the chance to purchase houses at a 
low price. Howard Dick (2002:215) has remarked of the public housing initia-
tives in Surabaya: ‘The rate of construction hardly made a dent in the overall 
housing shortage, but it eased the housing crisis for an expanding govern-
ment bureaucracy and the armed forces’. On balance, this assertion applied 
to post-Independence public housing in other cities as well.
To round off the story, at the same time as public housing policy shrank 
to the question of how the bureaucracy could house itself, some people 
continued to worry about how the government could help the masses. The 
government gradually found a solution, at least on paper, for the lack of state 
funds for construction: it laid increasingly more stress on the responsibility 
of the people at large to help resolve the shortage of housing. In the eyes of 
the policymakers, the Jajasan Kas Pembangunan therefore had the task of 
mobilizing the ‘oto-aktiviteit’ (self-help) of the people (Antara, 21-8-1952/B, 
7-11-1952/B, 8-1-1954/A, 4-8-1954/A). Fortuitously, the appeal to the people 
was also in tune with the then prevalent post-revolutionary discourse on 
co-operatives and mutual assistance (gotong royong) as defining features of 
the Indonesian nation. The policy of aided self-help housing came down to 
leaving the people to solve their own problems. And so they did. Squatting 
became arguably the most common way of finding a dwelling in cities in the 
1950s (Colombijn 2010:207-24).
17 Antara, 9-9-1955/B, 28-9-1955/A; Djoemadjitin et al. 1977:123; Mackie 1967:87; Madjalah Kota 
Medan 3/19 1956:28-9; Undang-undang darurat 1955/19 tentang pendjualan rumah2 Negeri ke-
pada pegawai negeri.
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Conclusion
In this article I have tried to look at public housing in the early 1950s, taking the 
perspective at least some Indonesians must have taken at the time: by looking at 
the achievement of the 1950s using the preceding colonial times as a yardstick. 
The impact of decolonization on public housing was small, partly because the 
role of public housing itself in the provision of housing was marginal, both 
before and after Independence. Public housing even played a minor role in the 
segment of the market in which it was strongest: lower middle-class housing. 
Financial constraints put severe limits on what was achieved by whichever of 
the three financial systems that were tried out: gemeentelijke woningbedrijf; N.V. 
Volkshuisvesting; and Jajasan Kas Pembangunan. The financial constraints 
ruled out the chance that public housing reached all layers of society.
Ann Stoler has argued that the colonial venture was a middle-class affair; 
the elite flocked to the support of those Europeans who failed to keep up 
middle-class appearances and thereby damaged the prestige of the colonial 
overlords (Stoler 1989:149-53). She could have included public housing in 
building up her case, despite the efforts of Surabaya, Semarang, and, with 
less determination, some other municipalities to build dwellings for coo-
lies and other low-income indigenous people. Looking at the record of the 
gemeentelijke woningbedrijven and N.V. Volkshuisvesting corporations she has 
a point. The target group of both institutions usually consisted of people with 
a middle-class lifestyle and formal education, who lacked the income to rent 
a middle-class house on the free market. In most towns people who, accord-
ing to the municipal administration, by income and lifestyle ‘belonged’ to 
the kampong were not targeted for public housing; their housing situation 
should be upgraded by kampong improvement, which in the view of colo-
nial (and post-colonial) administrators was a different matter. In practice, a 
disproportionate number of beneficiaries of the public housing policy were 
lower-ranking civil servants, often, but certainly not exclusively, of European 
or Eurasian background.
After Independence, there were two logical options about what should be 
done with this institute, which favoured lower middle-class Europeans, open 
to the Republican government: either to abolish public housing or to broaden 
its target group. I do not know whether the government ever formulated the 
question of what to do with public housing in this way. What is certain, is, at 
the seminal Congress on Healthy Public Housing of 1950, the professed target 
group was widened to include the whole urban population of Indonesia and 
the ideal standard for public housing was raised to the middle-class type of 
dwelling, in contrast to the degradingly small houses from colonial times. The 
Socialist Party of Indonesia, then a major opinion leader, framed this practical 
goal within a broader philosophical context, foreshadowing Amartya Sen’s 
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famous definition of development as freedom. In 1952 the Socialist Party of 
Indonesia declared that ‘[e]ach human being should be really free to fully 
develop his life and all his potentialities. Socialism will […] create those con-
ditions in which material conditions will not any longer constitute an obstacle 
for progress and development’ (Socialist Party 1952:14). This also entails ‘the 
right to decent housing’ (Socialist Party 1952:18).
However, economic reality soon caused a divergence from the initial 
revolutionary and optimistic ideals. Limited state funding, gradually eroded 
by inflation, required austerity measures and public housing construction 
subsided again in the mid-1950s. The more it dawned on the administrators 
that they were unable to build for the masses, the more they restricted pub-
lic housing to a policy of housing civil servants. While the professed target 
group was broadened after the transfer of sovereignty, the target group actu-
ally reached was narrowed down even more than in colonial times exclu-
sively to civil servants.
I wonder, by the way, what impact the failed housing policy made on the 
nationalist leaders of Indonesia. At first, the former colonial overlord was 
the significant Other that helped the nationalists to build a positive image of 
themselves as leaders who truly improved the lot of the masses. I assume that 
the later recognition on the part of the nationalist leaders that public housing 
in the 1950s was after all hardly a bigger success than colonial public housing 
may have been a blow to their self-image and forced them to question their 
own identity as a successful replacement of the Dutch.
The whole story of public housing in the 1950s can be summed up by the con-
cept of the ‘revolution of rising expectations’. This concept was in vogue in the 
1960s, and means that in many post-colonial states general welfare improved, 
but popular expectations of rising welfare (or income) increased faster. A revo-
lutionary atmosphere was created when the gap between the actual situation 
and expectations became too large, either because real growth increasingly fell 
behind more rapidly rising expectations, or when real improvements tempo-
rarily stayed away while expectations continued to rise.18
The disillusionment about unfulfilled expectations was perhaps best for-
mulated by Vice-President Mohamad Hatta. In 1956 he observed ‘a feeling of 
dissatisfaction […] everywhere’. ‘The gap between the actual state of affairs 
and our expectations is so great that in disgust people are apt to overlook the 
constructive things that have actually been accomplished’ (Hatta 1970:95). 
If the concept of a revolution of rising expectations indeed adequately 
describes the state of (public) housing in Indonesia in the 1950s, one wonders 
whether the housing situation contributed to a general feeling of disappoint-
18 Davies 1962; Oberschall; Taylor 1982. An alternative version, formulated by Daniel Lerner, 
emphasized the role of the mass media that induce people to think they could lead other, more 
modern lives than they actually did (Hornik 1977).
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ment and frustration in the 1950s and partly caused – as predicted by the 
concept of rising expectations – the (counter)revolutionary violence of 1965. 
Perhaps. We lack, however, data to establish with some certainty a causal 
relationship that goes beyond speculation. It is safer to postulate a more 
direct relationship between rising expectations in the early 1950s and a revo-
lutionary, pro-active willingness to occupy land for squatting in the 1950s.
I have not found evidence that political parties exploited popular discon-
tent with public housing to mobilize the masses. Public housing invariably 
ranked at the bottom of lists of policy goals of political parties, or was ignored 
altogether (Socialist Party 1952:18; Mortimer 1974:42, 53; PNI 1970:163). Too 
few people benefited from public housing and parties could build, and 
indeed attempted to build, a bigger constituency by championing the cause 
of the squatters (Colombijn 2010:219-21). 
Although the revolution of rising expectations with regard to public hous-
ing was not translated into direct political action, the concept is a powerful 
means to capture the general feeling about public housing at the time: great 
expectations about the new dawn followed by disappointment that nothing 
really changed in post-colonial times (see also Schulte Nordholt in this issue). 
Nonetheless, despite the empty rhetoric of the concepts of a ‘rumah sehat for 
everybody’ and ‘self-help housing’, one difference with colonial times was 
the fact that the administration at least professed a responsibility to house the 
whole population. In colonial times, ordinary Indonesians had very little to 
expect from public housing at all.
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